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diminished, making unenforceable the legal restrictions that had propped up the currency. The Jacobins fell in the summer of 1794, and the legal restrictions supporting the demand for assignats disappeared along with the Terror. Then France experienced a hyperinflation: real balances fell and prices exploded. The Directory administered the first classic hyperinflation in modern Europe until 1797, when it defaulted on two-thirds of the government's debt. Specie returned from England to France. In 1797, France returned to a specie standard and remained on it throughout the Napoleonic Wars. In 1797, Britain suspended convertibility with specie and did not reinstate it until 6 years after Napoleon had permanently left France.3
Macroeconomic Theories Coloring Our Observations
Two macroeconomic ideas and three models of money inform our chronicle of events.
Unpleasant arithmetic.-Government budget constraints and the arithmetic of compound interest impose restrictions on government deficits and debt. We use this arithmetic despite two difficulties. First, we have to assume that some commitment mechanism is available to support any sovereign borrowing.4 Second, when it is assumed that the government can borrow because it can commit to repay its debt, the government budget constraint alone imposes virtually no restrictions on tax and expenditure processes (see Hansen, Roberds, and Sargent 1991) . We obtain restrictions like those in Sargent and Wallace's (1981) "unpleasant arithmetic" only by arbitrarily putting an upper bound on the amount of government borrowing. Assertions that a fiscal crisis sparked the French Revolution hinge on positing a bound and on asserting that the French government was nearly hitting it.
Sustainable plans. -Chari and Kehoe (1990) define a "sustainable" government plan to be one that enlists the self-interest of each group to implement its part when the time or the contingency comes for it to act. "Reform" of the Old Regime was difficult precisely because its institutions were largely sustainable, as a sequence of French finance ministers from 1775 to 1789 discovered.
Tax-backed or asset-backed models of the demand for currency. -These 3This summary is based on our reading of the historical record. Other readings include Stourm (1885), Marion (1914-21, vols. 1-4), Harris (1930) , Aftalion (1987) , White (1989) , Bordo and White (1991) , and Brezis and Crouzet (1994) . 4 See Bulow and Rogoff s (1989) and Chari and Kehoe's (1993a) analyses of the severe limits on sovereign borrowing caused by the market's limited ability to punish sovereign defaults. See also Prescott (1977) and Manuelli (1988) . models describe accompanying fiscal arrangements through which new issues of paper money cause little or no inflation.
Legal restrictions models of the demand for currency.-These models study how a government can tax its citizens by forcing them to hold paper money it is issuing to finance a deficit; they describe circumstances in which large new issues of paper currency cause less inflation than would be expected if people were voluntarily holding the currency.
Classical hyperinflation models along lines described by Cagan (1956) .-These models describe circumstances in which rapidly issuing a paper currency causes prices to rise even faster than the quantity of currency.
We use these theories first to shape our descriptions and second to interpret how the revolutionaries explained their actions. We document how the revolutionaries used elements of these theories in the debates that shaped the Revolution. Our double use of theories reflects the rational expectations hypothesis that parts of a time-series model are used by the people within the model to guide their forecasts and decisions. We interpret inflation during the Revolution in terms of a procession of regimes in which the "if" parts of the three types of monetary models are approximately fulfilled.
II. Before the Revolution Even Absolute Monarchies Have Budget Constraints
The immediate cause of the French Revolution was the fiscal crisis of 1788. For 70 years, France had confronted a sequence of similar crises, all stemming from its incomplete efforts to adopt fiscal policies that Britain had used since 1688. 
The British Experience
The British pattern for this ratio was to increase during wars, when debt was incurred to pay for large military expenditures. During a war, taxes were raised to assure adequate funds to service the loans. After a war, the floating debt5 was consolidated into perpetual annuities, and taxes were further increased to generate a sufficient net-ofinterest surplus to service the debt. Figure 2 shows the components of Britain's budget constraint during the same period. Total fiscal revenues are set against total spending decomposed into military, civil, and debt service spending. The net-of-interest civil government spending is roughly constant. Military spending surges during wars. In contrast to the volatility of total government expenditures, revenues are smooth. The British government incurred large deficits in wartime and generated small but sufficient surpluses in peacetime. We observe a cycle of debt service rising during each war and then slowly declining with the onset of peace. Britain did not default on its debt during the 100 years following the Glorious Revolution of 1688, which reflected the existence of 5By floating debt we mean the following: in Britain, the unfunded debt (notes issued by the Exchequer or various departments, without an act of Parliament); in France, the anticipations, notes issued by the departments or financial officers on behalf of the government, typically maturing within 2 years. mechanisms intended to make the state creditworthy (see North and Weingast [1989] for a modern account). The British king retained executive power, but the Parliament gained the powers to examine and censor the budget and to vote taxes. By 1715, the system had been refined into a method of funding by which each loan was accompanied by a parliamentary vote for a specific tax to service the loan.
Established in 1694, the Bank of England became an important element of a mechanism committing the government to pay its debts. By the mid 1 720s, after the South Sea Bubble, the Bank had acquired virtual monopolies of servicing government debt and issuing notes. The Bank was designed to prevent the government from playing one lender against another.6 Its charter made it more difficult for the government to default, and the prominence of principal owners of the Bank ensured that any attempt to default would be well publi-cized. In exchange for abstaining from opportunistic behavior, the government acquired credit.7
Across the Channel For France, the three sharp falls in the ratio in figure 1 each correspond to an episode of reimbursement suspension and default in the form of cuts in interest payments. The Spanish Succession War in 1713 marks the first episode. By 1715, the debt service had been reduced through defaults on significant parts of the floating debt. The Regency (1715-23) witnessed the "system" of John Law, a vast operation that first reimbursed the debt with bank notes that devalued quickly. Next, the debt was reconverted into perpetuals and life annuities, with sharply reduced capital value. Finally, because these measures proved insufficient, an interest rate cut was imposed in 1726, by which time the debt service ratio stabilized at 30 percent.
The second episode occurred during the Seven Years' War in 1759, when the government converted the floating debt into perpetuals and halted scheduled reimbursements of fixed-term loans. These reductions continued until the Peace of Paris forced the government to resume its obligations for a short time. Lack of funds soon curtailed compliance. Meanwhile, the floating debt had again bloated to unmanageable proportions, so a third episode started in 1770. The ministry of Terray suspended reimbursements, converted the floating debt to perpetuals, and imposed coupon reductions on bonds of between 7 percent and 50 percent. Taxes were also increased in 1771-73. When Louis XVI succeeded his grandfather in 1774, the floating debt was negligible, debt service stood at less than 40 percent of revenues, and the budget was nearly balanced: 375 million livres in revenues offset 415 millions in expenditures, of which 40 millions were reimbursements of outstanding debt. These recurrent French defaults reveal different patterns of government revenues and spending between France and England. For this period, budget data for France are not as available as for Britain. To provide a counterpart to figure 2, we constructed estimates of revenues and the components of spending for the period 1759-88 (see fig. 3 ).8 Revenues increased sharply between 1770 and 1773, and 7 In 1797, the British government was to discover another major advantage to the institution, namely the suspension of convertibility of notes, which allowed the financing of the French wars. Significantly, the government did not default on the notes and resumed the gold standard at par in 1819, in effect redeeming the notes at face value and giving a handsome return to those who had accepted the notes during the Bank restriction.
8 France did not publish the government's accounts before the nineteenth century, and the financial archives burned in 1871. The remaining information is scarce, sparse, The contrast with figure 2 is instructive. In 1763 and 1783, there was no equivalent to the British debt funding, namely a tax increase sufficient to fund the interest on the debt accumulated during the previous war. In the 1760s, tax revenues remained constant. In the 1780s, they grew too slowly, causing debt service to increase. By 1788, as in 1770 and during the Regency, the inexorable compounding of interest brought France to a fiscal crisis.9 Figure 3 shows France in the grips of some "unpleasant arithmetic" (see Sargent and Wallace 1981 Riley (1987) .
9 Over the whole period, France was at war only one year out of three. The gross-ofinterest budget was in balance only briefly in the 1770s.
French Fiscal Backwardness or Optimality?
In figure 2, Britain looks like a simulation from a Barro (1979) tax smoothing; in figure 3, France does not. It is tempting to compare France's financial arrangements unfavorably to Britain's, but theories of dynamic Ramsey taxation instruct us to be cautious about condemning France's recurrent defaults or praising Britain's abstinence. These theories have governments offering their creditors statecontingent, after-tax returns that respond to news about the government's prospective net-of-interest fiscal surplus. Realization of a positive shock to government expenditures or a negative shock to ''exogenous" government revenues results in a lower payoff and good news in a higher payoff.10 We have not attempted to match these theories to our eighteenth-century observations on French and British finance. We would have to struggle to reconcile the timing of the French defaults with these theories, in which low after-tax returns are paid on government debt at the starts of "wars." Perhaps it could be argued that the French defaults occurred in response to reckonings that the prospective revenues expected to accrue with French war victory had evaporated with defeat. It would require much more work to coax from these theories an understanding of why France refused to default in 1789, despite its earlier intermittent defaults."
In 1789, modernizing elements in France did not regard past and prospective government defaults as part of an optimal fiscal arrangement. They hoped to reform fiscal institutions to rid France of those defaults, and this is one of the reasons they welcomed the king's call to the Estates General.
Snapshot of the Old Regime Laws
France had the appearance of an absolute monarchy. The king created law by edicts and took executive actions by Arrnts du Conseil, although not all laws emanated from the king. There were also legal traditions, with forms of common law and written law varying from province to province that preexisted royal edicts. The king confronted the power of a dozen Parlements, with the Paris court preeminent, which verified that new edicts were consistent with the existing There was no written constitution, yet legal scholars spoke of one and disputed it. An uneasy sense of balance existed between the king's divine right to rule and the secular necessities of legal continuity. France presented a paradox. The absolute power of the monarchy was acknowledged, and institutions were reinforced that effectively constrained centralized authority.
Offices
Positions in the Parlement were sold by the king and were inherited or resold by the "owner" with tacit royal consent and payment of a transaction tax. Holders of parliamentary offices, as well as other venal offices of justice, were known as the noblesse de robe. They formed a cohesive class united by their common arrangements with the Crown.
Beyond the noblesse de robe, there was a larger class of officers, more than 50,000 by the time of the Revolution, who also owned their offices. These positions in the judicial, police, administrative, and fiscal systems were properties owned and bequeathed by the officers. An officer's wages represented the interest on the sum, called the finance of the office, which he or his predecessor had paid to acquire the office.'2 The finances of all offices formed a component of the public debt that could not be altered or diminished without major institutional changes.'3
Taxes
Royal taxes under Louis XIV consisted of the taille, a direct tax of medieval origin from which the nobility was exempt, and a vast array 12 Office owners did not welcome increases in wages because they forced the owners to increase the finance or forfeit the office. 13 An officer's compensation often went beyond the wages themselves to include all forms of pecuniary and nonpecuniary rewards: feudal-like dues, legal or illegal bribes, prestige, tax exemption, and that most coveted prize, nobility itself (see Bien 1987 ). of indirect taxes on consumption and movements of commodities across France's numerous internal borders (droits, traites, aides, and gabelles). The king collected various feudal dues and revenues from the monopolies that he owned, including coin minting, salt, postal service, tobacco, parts of foreign trade, gunpowder manufacture, and the lottery.
The taille was collected differently in various regions. Within the kingdom's historic core, a system of direct allocation of tax liabilities by royal officers had evolved (the areas under this system were called pays d'election). The monies were collected by the receveurs, venal officers who pledged to pay the Treasury the amounts assessed according to a specific timetable. They regularly gave the Treasury rescriptions, or claims on themselves due a year hence, which the Treasury resold at discount. The receveurs earned interest on the funds collected and also received a commission on the taxes collected (see Bosher [1970] for details). Notes issued by the receveurs and billets issued by the Fermes Ge'nerales were called anticipation notes. These notes formed the floating debt system and also allowed private parties to transfer funds to and from Paris in the absence of a developed banking system.
More "recently" absorbed territories such as Brittany, Burgundy, Provence, Artois (fifteenth century), Bearn, Foix, Bigorre (sixteenth century), Franche-Comte, and Flanders (seventeenth century) negotiated their global tax dues with the king through the provincial Estates, which met regularly and were charged with collecting tax monies. Other direct taxes (the capitation in 1695) followed the same mode of assessment as the taille. Repeatedly throughout the eighteenth century, attempts were made to impose income taxes without respect to status or privilege. These attempts failed in terms of both the modest amounts collected in 1789 (12 percent of revenues) and the persisting irregularities in assessment.
Indirect taxes and monopolies were leased to syndicates of individuals who contracted with the king. Tax farmers collected taxes within the limits of the law in exchange for a specified amount of money for each year of the lease. The lease stated a minimum payment to the farmers and a rule for sharing the excess over that minimum between the king and the farmers. After 1726, the Fermes Ge'ne'rales collected all consumption taxes and internal duties, and managed the salt monopoly.14 A last form of tax collection called the regie was collected by government employees who received a salary and a commission. Louis XIV attempted but failed to use the regie. It was reintroduced first in the 1750s as a tax on leather and later to manage the king's feudal rights and the royal demesne. By 1789, 25 percent of fiscal revenues were collected through regies and 35 percent through farms. The remaining direct taxes were collected through the receveurs and provincial officers.
Taxation was not uniform across classes, occupations, or provinces. Specific groups often had the opportunity to pay an abonnement or waiver of a new tax or duty. The clergy paid taxes by recurrently conceding a don gratuit (free gift)."5 By 1789, the annual average of the clergy's tax bill was 10 millions, or less than 2 percent of the state's fiscal revenues, even though the church owned 10-15 percent of the property in France. Cities, provinces, professional corps, the royal princes, and religious associations also benefited from the waiver system.'6
The state's liabilities and commitments included favors, gifts, and pensions bestowed by the king. Favors often took a symbolic form. Historians marvel at how Louis XIV had the nobility competing for the honor of holding his shirt while he dressed. Other favors were more costly. Spending on pensions grew at an even faster rate than on defense during the reign of Louis XVI. The revolutionaries were astonished by the thousands of names on the pension lists, as well as by the multiple secret favors consigned in the Red Book and indignantly published by the Assembly. Other favors took the form of exchanges of lands, purchases of fiefdoms, and so on.
Apology for the Old Regime
The revolutionaries considered this structure to be antiquated and inefficient. But it served a purpose. The French nation had been formed over the centuries by granting concessions as well as by conquest, inheritance, and acquisition. Local customs and traditions, privileges, and hierarchies could not easily be overturned or ignored. Incorporating the local power structures into the French realm made it easier to win acceptance of the new rule. 
Fiscal Pressures to Reform
As wars expanded across continents and oceans, costs rose, and they were no longer funded in the traditional medieval way of raising sufficient taxes during wartime to cover expenditures. Credit was useful to France's foreign policy but difficult for a sovereign monarch to obtain. An obstacle to getting credit was the sovereign's monopoly of force and his power over contract enforcement. This problem was analyzed by Bulow and Rogoff (1989) and Chari and Kehoe (1993a). Chari and Kehoe's analysis is driven by the calculation that as long as a government does not lose access to a means of saving, the punishment of not being able to borrow in the future is not sufficient to deter a default: if it can lend, a government can tax smooth almost as well as it can by borrowing. From the standpoint of the analysis of Chari and Kehoe (1993a), the mystery is that the king could borrow as much as he did. Nevertheless, the debt sustainability problem preoccupied the king's ministers. In 1784, Jacques Necker wrote the following:
The absolute power of a monarch and full public trust are two notions which need intermediaries to be perfectly conciliated. This authority is in France subject to certain restraints when it comes to an increase in the sovereign's revenues, since the laws which levy new taxes must be registered in the Parlements, and these courts can then enlighten the mon- The last sentence is a succinct definition of "credible policy." However, several pieces of evidence indicate that France had somehow solved the sovereign debt problem.'7 First, in the late 1780s, the king had accumulated large debts and devoted over 50 percent of the state's revenues to servicing them. Second, in the late 1780s, the king adopted extraordinary measures to refrain from defaulting and to acquire more flexibility in servicing his debt, most significantly by convening the Estates General. Something impelled him not to default.'8 Third, bond prices in the late 1780s were not especially depressed.'9 Fourth, the Revolution would strain to honor the king's debts and would default only after 8 years of trying and failing with a variety of debt management schemes.
Up to 1789, France's fiscal arrangements had evolved unevenly, and the ability to adjust taxes did not match the king's plans to service his debts. As we have seen, France lived with an array of institutions whose purpose it was not only to provide funds to the king but also to constrain him. These constraints impinged particularly when it became desirable to raise taxes to service debts. The history of repeated defaults prior to Louis XVI is a symptom of France's failure to implement fully the commitment structures and tax system required to support a British-like fiscal policy. Necker (1784, 3:157) observed that "suspension of payments is much less a cause than a result of the lack of trust." Institutional constraints shaped policies, much as they were designed to. When finance ministers pushed against the constraints, the constraints held firm. Figure 4 shows that, relative to its population and national output, wars cost Britain more than France. The average annual cost of these wars typically amounted to 1-1.5 years of revenues in Britain, com-17 Conklin (1993) studied this problem for the finances of the Spanish monarchy in the sixteenth century and adduced the presence of punishments that the king's creditors could administer to supplement the act of refusing further lending. Chari and Kehoe (1993b) study how much debt can be sustained if inabilities to borrow are buttressed by prohibitions against future government lending, should it default. 18 The government seemed to care about its creditors more than it should according to representative agent models of sustainable government debt. But relative to models with agents who differ in their holdings of government debt, representative agent models overstate how difficult it is to sustain government debt. See Rogers (1986) for a study of how heterogeneity impinges on credibility of capital taxation.
Sentiment for Copying Britain
19 See Velde and Weir (1992). The period 1764-70 shows a steady increase in the market discount on government loans, up to yields of 10 percent; in contrast, up to August 1788, only the most recent loans were discounted, only up to yields of 8 percent, whereas perpetuals remained under 6.5 percent. The suspension of reimbursements of August 1788 affected fixed-term loans, but perpetuals remained stable. pared to 0.5-0.8 in France. The Seven Years' War, which proved so costly and disastrous to the French, cost 40 percent more to the British, although England's population was a third of France's and its income half. As Necker noted, "England still today [in the midst of a war] can find 300 millions to borrow at 3% each year, and exerts amounts of efforts and power out of proportion with its wealth and population" (1781, p. 16).
It is known that French officials understood the case for smoothing taxes. In the 1770s, Montyon, a senior civil servant in the French Finance Ministry, wrote that20
Great Britain finances by taxation neither all nor part of the costs of war, it finances them by loans and increases the annual tax burden only by the amount necessary to face the interest and redemption of the loan. That is the regime that France must adopt, and will adopt sooner or later because its value is only too obvious, and our own mistakes will force us to return to this policy. In wartime it is our habit to increase taxes, at a time when perhaps they should be decreased. Indeed in wartime the country suffers enough from the labor withdrawn from agriculture and manufactures to be sent into the army, the navy, and into the production activities necessitated by war. 
Sustainability or Bad Choices?
It has been argued, most recently by Riley (1986), Schama (1989) , and White (1989) , that the fiscal problems of the Old Regime in France were not the consequence of fatally wounded institutions, but of particular choices made by the king's ministers; that different and wiser policy actions had been feasible; and that failure to take wiser actions indicated the incompetence or competing interests of the policymakers. Such arguments forget that the French monarchy was not really absolute and that social institutions put a host of participation and incentive constraints on people.
French finance ministers understood arithmetic and compound interest.23 They tried to emulate the fiscal policies of Britain but faced different constraints on their actions. Their failure to achieve outcomes that would have been attainable had they had more authority to make commitments reflects a deficient "commitment technology," or the existence of mechanisms designed to protect other commitments.
The Last Fiscal Crisis of the Old Regime
The reign of Louis XVI had started auspiciously in 1774 because the defaults and tax increases imposed by Terray in 1770-72 had left the new finance minister Turgot with close to a balanced budget. The 20-year-old monarch pledged never to default on the public debt. However, Turgot's aversion to military adventures and efforts to implement far-reaching reforms placed him at odds with vested interests, which eventually led to his downfall. Rather than follow Turgot's 22 Louis XIV, whose first years of reign were troubled by the Paris Parlement's unrest, had imposed his will on the Parlements and deprived them of the right to remonstrate. When he died and left the regent's powers severely curtailed in his will, the regent bartered with the Parlement: the court would declare the will null and void, and he would return the right of remonstrance. and suppressing all offices. However, the Assembly did not intend to default on the state's obligations to the officers. It regarded offices as properties and intended to repurchase them. Table 1 The Assembly discussed tax reform in terms of physiocratic theories and was willing to take the time required to implement a neutral tax system designed to distort relative prices minimally.25 The Assembly relied heavily on the contribution fonciere and abolished consumption taxes because it wanted to tax pure rents. The administrative instructions on how to implement the fonciere specified that the piece of land itself was really being taxed and that the owner was but a proxy for the purposes of that payment.
Administering the foncie're would require compiling and continually updating a complete register of all plots in the kingdom. The failure of the Revolution's tax system traces to the fact that rather than establish a new central administration, the Constituants relied on the newly created local administrations, which had scant incentives to be helpful. The shortage of tax revenues later determined the destiny of the assignat. Figure 5 shows that revenues took a long time to return to prerevolutionary levels. Per capita taxation in the French Empire did not reach prerevolutionary levels until 1810. Thus tax reform did not take effect rapidly enough to solve the debt problem.
Birth of a Currency
In response to a motion by the least ecclesiastical of bishops, Talleyrand, the National Assembly placed the church's assets "at the Nation's disposal," giving the state a "privatization problem." Necker and the Constituants planned to solve the privatization problem and the debt problem by creating a new currency. They devised a scheme to raise revenues by auctioning the confiscated lands, thereby withdrawing paper notes issued on the security of the lands sold by the government. This "tax-backed money" scheme propelled the state into the domain of monetary experimentation. Records of their debates show how members of the Assembly marshaled theory and evidence to assess the likely effects of their innovation. They quoted David Hume and Adam Smith and cited John Law's system of 1720 and the American experiences with paper money 15 years earlier as examples of how paper money schemes can go awry.
Necker's original plan embodied two components: a National Bank and a new financial instrument, the assignat. Necker's National Bank was patterned after the Bank of England. He proposed to transform the Caisse d'Escompte into a National Bank by granting it a monopoly on issuing notes and marketing government debt. The Caisse was a discount bank founded in 1776 whose main function was to discount commercial bills and issue convertible notes. Although independent of the government in principle, it had occasionally been used as a source of loans. Its notes had been declared inconvertible in August 1788, and by the time of Necker's proposal, its reserves were exhausted. Necker's plan placed the National Estates (as the church lands became known after the addition of the royal demesne) at the center of the financial picture: a "Bank of France" would issue a 5 percent security mortgaged on the prospective receipts from the modest sale of some 400 millions' worth of National Estates in the years 1791 93.26
Must we hand the State over to a syndicate of publicans? [Deputy Rewbell, December 19, 1789]
The deputies split Necker's plan by accepting the assignat but not the Bank. They refused to establish a Bank mainly because they understood it to be a commitment mechanism. A masterful lecture by Dupont de Nemours on the real-bills doctrine explained how a Bank would operate. Bankers such as Necker, Lecouteulx, and Laborde backed the proposal,27 but the deputy La Rochefoucauld attacked the idea of a bank on the grounds that "the funds it would lend to the State, and the services it would seem to render, would force the government to show regards it would not have to display toward a multitude of individual enterprises" (Archives parlementaires, 10:673; emphasis added). The chairman of the Finance Committee, Anson, said: "Let us never overlook the fact that the various forced paper-monies issued in a kingdom by the sole authority of a monarch or his cabinet, after having taken the nature of an injustice from their origin, will encounter resistance in their use, and their easy multiplication offers countless abuses; but all these flaws disappear when a paper-money is an emanation of the general will. Who among us would dare question its value? That would be mistrusting ourselves" (Archives parlementaires, 12:606).
To end in a day the work of a half-century. [Deputy Montesquiou, chairman of the Finance Committee, August 27, 1790]
By mid 1790, members of the National Assembly had agreed to sell the National Estates and to use the proceeds to service the debt28 in 26 Only 170 millions were to be used initially to cover the deficits of 1789 and 1790. 27 The British funding system was also based on the word of the Parliament; but the Parliament entered into a balance of power with the executive, whereas the Constituent Assembly did all it could to diminish the executive power (the king and his cabinet), which it did not trust. 28 The current weight of the debt on government revenues was over 60 percent when due reimbursements were included. a "tax-backed money" scheme.29 The government would issue securities with which it would reimburse debt. The securities were acceptable as payment for National Estates purchased at auctions; once received in payment, they were to be burned. (The Appendix describes the mechanics of the auctions.) The Estates available for sale were thought to be worth about 2,400 millions, and the exactable debt (essentially fixed-term loans, unpaid arrears, and liquidated offices) stood at about 2,000 millions. The value of the land was sufficient to let the Assembly retire all the exactable debt and thereby eliminate the interest payments on it.
After lengthy debates, in August 1790, the Assembly set the denomination and interest rate structure of the debt. These debates foreshadowed many issues that were later to be studied by Friedman (1948) 
and Bryant and Wallace (1979). Proponents of "bonds" (largedenomination, high-interest liabilities) contended against advocates of issuing "money" (low-denomination, low-interest liabilities).30
Bond advocates asserted that it would be wise to isolate these "credit" operations from monetary arrangements, and cited it as an advantage that, when bonds were issued to pay off the national debt, the operation exchanging the National Estates for the debt would involve only financially sophisticated people.3' Advocates of money asserted that lower denominations would bring about lower interest costs. They also recommended low denominations as a means of involving many people in the swap and binding them to the Revolution. They asserted that a low-denomination assignat would provide France with a new monetary instrument and do for its depressed economy what bank notes seemed to do in Britain: ease credit, lower interest rates, and facilitate trade. 29 Two distinct aspects of monetary theory help in thinking about the assignat plan. First, a system beginning with a commodity standard typically has room for a once-andfor-all emission of (an unbacked) paper currency that can replace the commodity money without generating inflation. Sargent and Wallace (1983) describe models with this property. That commodity money systems are wasteful underlies Friedman's (1959) preference for a fiat money regime over a commodity money. Second, in a small country on a commodity money system that starts with restrictions on intermediation, those restrictions can be relaxed by letting the government issue bank notes on the security of safe private indebtedness, while leaving bank notes convertible into gold at par. See Smith (1776) 33 Since gold coins were of 24 and 48 livres and silver coins mostly of 3 and 6 livres, the assignat was to substitute for gold specie at first and then silver; in the end it also replaced copper and billon. 34 The assignat was adopted on September 29, 1790. The first debts to be reimbursed were the abolished offices and the financiers' short-term notes, which reflects the Assembly's insistence on respecting past commitments. deemed quickly. By July 1792, 75 percent of the stock of notes of 500-2,000 livres had been redeemed in payments on Estates or exchanged for lower denominations.38 By contrast, almost 98 percent of the 50-livre notes were still circulating. The interest coupons on the first batch of assignats, worth between 3 and 15 livres, circulated at a premium until the government issued its 5-livre notes in late 1791. More evidence of strong demand for small-denomination currency comes from the fact that within weeks of the September 1790 vote, private as well as public banks appeared across the country to provide intermediation services. The National Assembly abstained from regulating the industry, and soon there were hundreds of banks. In exchange for assignats, these banks issued their own currency in denominations ranging from 0.025 to 25 livres. Some banks were privately owned and operated for profit; others were set up by local authorities and cities. Public banks tended to operate with 100 percent reserves (see White 1990 ). Some private coinage also occurred, particularly in Paris and Lyon, where merchants minted copper coins redeemable in assignats.
The Assembly responded by eliminating its competitors in the business of issuing currency. In June 1791, it approved a plan to issue 5-livre notes, thereby placing the assignat squarely in competition with silver, the main specie in France (two-thirds of the preRevolution coinage was in silver). The notes were quickly issued in exchange for higher denominations, and by August 1792 they represented over a third of the total outstanding stock of assignats. The private banks then began issuing smaller denominations, and the billets de confiance (as this private money was collectively known) multiplied (see White 1990) .
Again the Assembly moved to meet the competition from the private banks. In December 1791, notes of 0.5-2.5 livres were approved without much debate. But there were delays and difficulties in manufacturing them. For the high denominations of previous issues, production costs had been a very low percentage of face value. The low face value of the new notes caused the government to simplify and cheapen the production process, at the risk of making counterfeiting easier.39 In August 1792, the first "small assignats" appeared. The government could now impose a monopoly: within a few weeks, all private banks were forbidden to issue their notes, and private coins were outlawed. The various Caisses Patriotiques, as the money-issuing banks were most often called, were conveniently accused of fraud 38 The proportion of redeemed notes of all denominations rose abruptly in April 1792, when war was declared. 39 These notes were nevertheless the most expensive assignats made, at a cost close to 1 percent of face value. Small-denomination assignats tended to remain in circulation and to drive specie out of the country, just as Smith (1776) Marie Antoinette's own assessment of investment opportunities in France two months before the overthrow of the monarchy (on August 10, 1792) attests to the success of the land sales. The sales, which opened in Paris in October 1790, were the pivotal element of the new currency system. In the early months of 1791, sales were rapid and prices high. By November 1791, over 1,500 millions of Estates had been adjudicated across France. Prices paid for the lands reflected a capitalization rate of 3-3.5 percent applied to the yields on land, which matched rates then being applied to exchanges of rental properties in France. Overbidding in expectation of inflation was thus limited.
In May 1790, when the specific arrangements for the sales were voted, it had been decided to offer purchasers of National Estates generous payment terms. A down payment of only 12-30 percent was required, with the balance payable in assignats and due in 12 yearly installments. The government accepted large claims on private debtors, payable in assignats. This arrangement is interpretable as a version of a financing scheme described by Persson, Persson, and Svensson (1987), by which a government attenuates the time consistency problem of Auernheimer (1974) and Calvo (1978)-its temptation to inflate away outstanding nominal claims on it-by acquiring nominal claims on the public. In November 1791 the government tried to shorten the terms of payment to 4 years for all subsequent sales. This immediately had a negative effect on sales, which forced the government to reverse its decision within weeks. The 12-year schedule of payment (shortened to 10 years in 1794) was maintained until 1796. In June 1793, after its policy had evolved from "real bills" to "inflationary finance" under the pressures of war, the Convention voted to sell these claims. There were few buyers.
War
The declaration of war on the German Empire and Austria on April 20, 1792, proved to be a turning point in the Revolution. Most people supported the conflict, although isolated individuals such as Robespierre voiced their opposition in vain. War forced changes in the monetary-fiscal experiment. Debt payments were suspended indefinitely, and the assignat was converted from its initial purpose to become the main means of financing the war. When the war started, the assignat had already depreciated 25 percent in real terms and 40 percent against gold. As Laffon-Ladebat explained on May 14:
The 1,500 millions of assignat balances are virtually the only monetary instruments (signes repre'sentatifs); this is close to 1,000 millions less than the specie in France before the Revolution. Compared to gold, they represent no more than 750 or 800 millions; they are clearly insufficient. Thus it is not the quantity emitted which occasions the assignat's depreciation, but its nature, and the distrust shared even by men who should reassure the Nation....
The high price of gold is not caused by an excessive mass of assignats in circulation, 
Legal Restrictions
Threat of death for offenders enforced parity of assignats with specie. It was illegal to hold such assets as commodities, private financial securities, precious metals, specie, jewelry, or foreign exchange, and markets in them were closed. Holding land was permitted. All assets and bonds constituting the public debt were converted into a single nontransferable perpetual rent title. In response to inflation, grain prices, then consumer prices and wages, and later producer prices were controlled with the so-called laws on the Maximum.42 Currency demand was supported by the laws on the Maximum and restrictions against hoarding.
Under the Terror, any citizen accused of violating these laws could expect swift and arbitrary proceedings. The law on parity of the assi-gnat called for arraignment and trial within 48 hours of the offense. The law encouraged denunciations from informants and gave extravagant powers to local authorities to enforce the restrictions. In a few dozen instances, the death penalty was imposed for crimes against the assignat or for hoarding.43
The debt remained intact. The conversion of outstanding bonds into perpetuals in August 1793 protected the value of these claims against reimbursement in depreciated paper, leaving future governments with a still-overwhelming burden of debt service.44 Market prices for government bonds, available until June 1793, remained high, suggesting that a major default was not deemed likely, even while the political situation deteriorated.
The May 45 Implementing optimal fiscal and debt management policies requires recourse to long-term bonds with the possibility of conversion at the debtor's option. France was forced into the use of short-term loans and self-amortizing life annuities, whereas Britain successfully converted to perpetuals. 46 The Jacobins consistently refused to alter the terms under which the sales had been made; even in the summer of 1795, they remained opposed to the abandonment of the assignat's legal equivalence to gold in payments for National Estates and taxes. On his way to the guillotine, the fallen dictator was jeered with the cry, 'Toutu Maximum!"47 Within 2 months, it was evident that efforts to enforce the Maximum were futile. Legal restrictions were ignored, although the laws were not repealed until January 1795. A police report in early October 1794 notes that "the majority of the people wants complete freedom of trade again; it thinks that supply will then be plentiful, that the price of commodities would rise at first but then fall with competition" (Aulard 1898, 1:152) . A few weeks after Cambon's arrest, trade in specie became legal, and the commodities, foreign exchange, and financial markets reopened. In June 1795, the government ceased to value the assignat at par for receipts, payments on National Estates, or expenditures. Instead, the government specified a rule according to which currency was valued as a function of the current money stock (each increase of the stock by 500 millions triggered a 20 percent devaluation). A month later, creditors were relieved of the legal obligation to accept reimbursements in paper. The assignat had become a full-fledged fiat currency, severed from specie.
As the apparatus of legal restrictions disappeared, the demand for the currency fell, and the assignat became known as "Parisian money." Police reports attest that by the fall of 1795, even Parisians were deserting the assignat in favor of hoardable commodities, a portfolio adjustment labeled "speculation" (agiotage) by an irate government. People joked that if the walls of Parisian houses were to tumble, the starving population would be smothered in food and drowned in wine. Specie was also in great demand, and there is evidence that gold appreciated relative to assignats, particularly in exchange for manufactured goods. In terms of gold, prices were lower than in 1790, creating trading opportunities for the savvy. A Swiss visiting Paris hastened to change his gold for paper; bought hundreds of shoes, stockings, and hats; shipped them off to Switzerland; and lived in Paris like a king for a month. Foreign exchange prices corroborate these anecdotes by showing that in the fall of 1795, silver was 20 percent cheaper in Paris than in Hamburg, a signal prompting imports of specie into France. Figure 13 briefly reenacted Jacobin measures against hoarding. In December 1795, financial markets were again closed and denounced as a "den of thieves and conspirators, who plot to starve us back to monarchy" (Moniteur Universel, 23 Frimaire 4). The government reopened the markets three weeks later when it wanted to know the market price of its money.
The government implemented a mandatory open-market operation, called the Forced Loan (December 10, 1795). Taxpayers were required to turn over a specific quantity of assignats in exchange for interest-bearing coupons admissible in payment of future tax liabilities. The assignats were accepted at a 100:1 ratio, and the government expected to collect 600 millions (in real terms) within 10 weeks. The Directory's inability to collect taxes efficiently doomed the plan: it took 5 months to collect 50 millions. The assignat's price lifted briefly from 0.5 percent to 0.7 percent of face value and then fell even further.
Nothing could save the assignat. Ramel-Nogaret, the new finance minister, said "it was impossible to maintain the assignat's initial credit, if it is true, as experience has taught us, that any currency (un signe quelconque) may lose its value not only proportionately to in-creases in quantity, but even at a progressive rate" (Moniteur Universel, 14 Pluviose 4). The government made a final effort to support the assignat. On December 23, 1795, the legislature reckoned the current circulation to be 24 billions and set a final ceiling of 40 billions. When that limit was reached, all the instruments, fonts, and forms were carried to the Place Vendome in Paris and disposed of in a solemn ceremony (February 19, 1796) . Ramel-Nogaret eulogized the assignat: "The assignats have made the Revolution; they have brought about the destruction of orders and privileges; they have overturned the throne and founded the Republic; they armed and equipped those formidable armies which have carried the tricolor flag beyond the Alps and the Pyrenees.... We owe them our freedom" (Moniteur Universel, 14 Pluviose 4).
Meanwhile, the Directory's need for funds continued. Two abortive attempts were made to create a successor currency to the assignat. The first took place outside the legislature in February 1796. A private group of bankers, including shareholders of the defunct Caisse d'Escompte and future organizers of the Bank of France (which would be created in 1800), proposed to take over the remaining National Estates and to manage or sell them as it saw fit. In exchange, the bankers would provide the government every month with 25 millions in bank notes, convertible on demand into specie. In spite of the executive's interest, the project was defeated in the legislature, where opposition to "putting the Constitution in the safe deposit of the bankers" (in the words of an opponent) was still very strong.
The legislature decided to retry the real-bills method of issuing money. A specific set of National Estates (including church lands in annexed territories) was earmarked for sale: 2,400 millions of a new currency, the mandate, were issued to retire the assignats at 30: 1 and to finance spending for 1796. The sales were to be made at fixed prices (computed mechanically by multiplying the property's income in 1790 by a capitalization factor) rather than through auctions, and payments were scheduled over a 6-month period. Starting at 35 percent of face value in March, the mandat fell to 6 percent by early summer 1796. The mandat failed even though the government did not issue one note beyond the self-imposed 2,400 million ceiling. By August the government ceased to accept the mandat at par for taxes or payments for the Estates. Land sales were suspended in October 1796, and the mandat and assignat were demonetized on February 4, 1797, thus ending 7 years away from a metallic standard.
One last monetary experiment accompanied the demise of paper money. In June 1797, a law established a depreciation table for reimbursing nominal contracts made between January 1791 and July 1796. The amount of specie to be repaid was adjusted to reflect the value of the assignat at the time of the contract. In each delpartement, local administrations computed an index of the value of the assignat against gold and also against commodities and land.48 By December 1797, these indexes were available to settle claims between individuals.
Default
The debt problem, fomenter of the Revolution, became acute in 1796. The government, with a larger perpetual debt to service after the conversion of August 1793, remained unable to raise revenues from the fiscal system inherited from the Constituante. Once paper money became unavailable, the government started paying the interest on the debt with IOUs acceptable in payment for national lands. The market discounted these 77-85 percent. The price of government debt remained accordingly low (see fig. 14) since the market did not expect major improvements in interest payments.49 The con-servative majority elected in the spring of 1797, and the resounding defeat of the former members of the Convention, raised hopes that were quickly dashed by the 18 Fructidor coup. The executive purged the legislature and cut the debt by two-thirds. The "two-thirds bankruptcy" applied to both perpetual and life annuities. It consisted of a "mobilization" of two-thirds of the capital (life annuities were capitalized at 10 times), which was reimbursed to debt holders in the form of bons du 2/3, or vouchers, admissible in payment for National Estates. The remaining third of the capital was "consolidated" into annuities, and exact payments were promised in the future. The two-thirds vouchers were nearly a total loss since the market priced them at 1-2.5 percent of face value. As figure 14 shows, the market anticipated the bankruptcy. ship. Much later, when an irritated Emperor Napoleon asked Talleyrand how he had become so rich, the expert flatterer answered: "Why, Sire, I simply bought a lot of government bonds on 17 Brumaire and sold them three days later" (Orieux 1974, p. 256) . Figure  15 confirms that Talleyrand earned a handsome return. This anecdote suggests that some people expected a strong government to end financial disorder. France returned to an absolute monarchy under another name.
Paradoxes accompanied the Napoleonic stabilization. Numerous practices of the Old Regime were reestablished for tax collection. Bond monies were required from officials who were granted a commission on amounts collected.53 A strong central control over allocation, assessment, and collection of taxes was asserted, reversing the Revolution's ineffectual reliance on local authorities. Indirect taxation, abandoned by the Constituante and reluctantly brought in on a small scale by the Directory, was considerably extended with custom tariffs and excise taxes. tween 12 and 30 percent) and sign 12 promissory notes for the rest, in 12 equal payments over 12 years, at 5 percent interest. The buyer retained the option to prepay part or all of the remaining balance (later, premiums were offered to those who paid early). Acceptable means of payment were gold and silver, assignats, and some debt certificates used by the liquidation agency to liquidate small offices. The latter were few in quantity (less than 2 percent of the value of the assignats issued in March 1792). When payment was made in assignats, the assignats were canceled immediately and then sent to Paris for burning. When payment was made in coin, the coins were sent to Paris and then exchanged at the Treasury for assignats held by the Treasury, which were then canceled and burned.
From July 1793 to February 1796, the "Second Origin Estates" from the estates of the emigres were auctioned. They were sold under similar rules to the earlier ones, but with 10-year terms instead of 12. By January 1794, both categories of estates were placed under the same rules. 57 From March 1796 to November 1796, a similar sales system was implemented as part of the mandat experiment. Estates were estimated at 22 times income (18 for houses) and awarded to the first bidder who made a 25 percent deposit, the balance of which was due within 3 months, payable in mandats at face value. In late July, the balances due were to be paid in mandats at market value. In Septemnber, auctions replaced the single-bid system.
Sale of National Lands continued until 1815 (see Bournisien [1908] and Marion [1908] for details).
